We study behavioral motivations for the adoption of corporate stock repurchase programs. Stock repurchase program adoption was more likely when CEOs were paid with large grants of stock options and when there was high levels of uncertainty regarding future firm performance.
INTRODUCTION
Firms have begun to adopt a number of strategic initiatives, such as poison pills, golden parachutes, downsizing, and incentive alignment mechanisms. Some mechanisms help executives fend off threats to their administration (Davis, 1991) . Others provide safety nets that allow the executives to walk away from a takeover with wealth windfalls (Davis, 1991) . Still others appear to appease corporate constituents by restructuring the firm (Davis & Stout, 1992) or the governance arrangements (Zajac & Westphal, 1994) in a way that conforms to shareholders' best interests. The adoption of such initiatives has been described extensively through the logic of institutional theory and rational economic perspectives (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) . Often lacking from such explanations is the role that top executives play in the adoption of strategic initiatives.
In this study we take a behavioral approach (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Simon, 1957) to investigate how top executives may cause their firms to adopt strategic initiatives that both help the executive cope with the uncertainty associated with shareholder activism and at the same time improve their personal financial well being. Executives may adopt strategic corporate initiatives that will be positively received by shareholders and thereby reduce the effective power of such pressures. The adoption of shareholder friendly initiatives (i.e., those widely believed to be positively valued by the markets) reduces the threat of shareholder interference by creating immediate, even if short term, value for shareholders.
One strategic initiative that appears to have resulted from increased shareholder activism is the repurchasing of a firm's own stock in the open market ("stock repurchase programs"). Stock repurchase programs have ballooned from approximately $20 billion in 1991 to a record $177 billion in 1996, with 1,475 firms announcing some level of stock repurchase. Because stock repurchases regularly result in higher stock prices (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1995) , key stakeholders applaud this form of resource allocation. When a firm has surplus free cash flow but does not have sufficient positive net-present-value investment alternatives within the firm, stock repurchase programs are a tax-favorable means to return capital to shareholders (Jensen, 1986) . Also, if the firm's shares are undervalued, repurchases represent a profitable investment option.
Controlling for such rational explanations of stock repurchase activity, why are all executives not similarly motivated to initiate stock repurchase programs? Absent strong motivation, the natural tendency for executives may be to avoid stock repurchase programs (Jensen, 1986) . We argue that executives are more likely to adopt repurchases when confronted with significant uncertainty that posses a threat to their tenure and wealth. We identify four factors that may provide such a behavioral impetus for stock repurchases.
Shareholder Pressure
When stock ownership is particularly concentrated, the ability of these powerful owners ("Blockholders") to monitor and control is very strong (Davis, 1991) . As a result, corporate executives are under increasing pressure to satisfy the demands of powerful shareholders to boost share price (Useem, 1996) . One way executives may respond to a high level of blockholder ownership is to engage in strategic initiatives that readily find favor among large investors. Specifically, announcing a stock repurchase program is likely to be well received by blockholders because it results in higher stock prices. Moreover, a repurchase program may be beneficial to blockholders because the sheer size of their ownership stake makes disposing of their shares problematic (Useem, 1996) . Whether the blockholder participates in the repurchase program (i.e., sells their shares) or not, they benefit by it. Therefore, executives may be able to use such programs as a way to reduce pressures otherwise associated with such ownership. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: H1: Blockholder ownership will be positively associated with the value of announced stock repurchase programs
Uncertainty of Executive Pay
Stock options provide executives with significant wealth upside potential, but they also introduce an element of uncertainty. Should executives not be successful at creating higher share prices, they receive no payout from their options. Due to the fact that options lose their value if the firm's share price does not increase, executives may take satisficing courses of action to assure themselves of not losing all the potential wealth associated with their stock options. Specifically, they may adopt some shareholder friendly initiatives because by so doing they create some value in their options and avoid losing all upside potential. Moreover, they may pursue such courses of action even when there are other higher net-present-value alternatives (e.g., new product development, R&D), if such alternatives are longer-term and higher-risk than the satisficing strategic initiative that can provide an immediate boost in option value. Therefore, stock repurchase programs allow executives to simultaneously manage the uncertainty of potentially impatient investors and that of their personal wealth. This logic results in the following hypothesis:
H2: CEO stock option pay will be positively associated with the value of announced stock repurchase programs.
Confidence in Firm Performance
Executives who are confident in their ability to create value through the normal course of business have less need to implement repurchase programs. Consequently, such executives should perceive less uncertainty regarding the future value of their options . We identify two related factors that should have a strong bearing on how confident executives are that they will achieve high levels of performance without stock repurchase programs: recent levels of firm performance and uncertainty of future performance.
When recent performance is high there should be less external pressure to try new initiatives to create performance gains because constituents generally attribute good performance to superior leadership. Moreover, CEO's of firms with high levels of recent performance are likely to believe that if they continue with their current strategies they will also continue to create value in the firm. Conversely, low levels of recent performance can cause the precise opposite reactions.
In addition to performance level, performance uncertainty likely affects a CEO's confidence in performance. When there is little uncertainty regarding future performance executives will be more confident that they can profit from their option pay by continuing with the strategic status quo. However, when the prospects for future firm performance are highly uncertain, executives are likely to perceive that they have less assurance of ultimately receiving large payouts in the future when they can exercise the options. Because low levels of recent performance and high uncertainty with respect to future performance can reduce a CEO's confidence in future performance levels, such factors are likely to exacerbate the incentive effect of stock options. Repurchases allow such executives to reduce his or her personal uncertainty regarding future option value caused by a lack of confidence in future performance. This logic leads to the following hypotheses: H3: Firm performance will negatively moderate the relationship between CEO stock option pay and the value of announced stock repurchase programs.
H4: The uncertainty associated with firm performance will positively moderate the association between CEO stock option pay and the value of announced stock repurchase programs.
Failure to Meet Expectations
Regardless of the absolute level of performance achieved, how that performance stacks up with ex ante expectations can have a strong bearing on executives' perceived need to take action. Failure to meet performance expectations can cause an increase in shareholder vigilance and interference. For example, money managers are likely to exert several forms of influence that could be quite uncomfortable for executives (Useem, 1996) . Therefore, when a firm's returns are not up to ex ante expectations, executives may resort to implementing shareholder friendly initiatives such as stock repurchase programs as a way to satisfice and appease shareholders. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: H5: For a given level of ex ante performance expectations, lower realized performance will increase the value of announced stock repurchase programs.
RESEARCH METHOD
We randomly sampled 250 of the S&P 500 and collected four consecutive years of data (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) for each firm. Data regarding stock repurchase announcements were collected from the Wall Street Journal. Executive compensation and stock ownership, blockholder ownership, and board composition data were collected from firm proxy statements. Firm financial data were collected from PC-Compustat. We estimated our models using Tobit regression because it is well suited for dependent variables that are censored at zero. All predictor variables are measured in the year prior to the measurement of stock repurchase announcements.
Stock repurchase activity was measured as the announced value of a stock repurchase program during a given year. Blockholder ownership was measured as the total percentage of a company's shares owned by all external shareholders that own more than five percent of the outstanding shares of the firm. CEO stock option pay was measured as the total value of stock options granted. We measured recent firm performance using stockholder returns during the prior year, while we measured uncertainty in future firm performance as the standard deviation in shareholder returns over the previous three years. We measured ex ante expectations of firm performance as the firm's market-to-book ratio. We also controlled for logical explanations for firm stock repurchase activity by including a comprehensive group of control variables: the firm's free cash flow, CEO stock ownership, firm size, firm debt to equity, the firm's total option exposure, performance expectations (market-to-book), and firm diversification level. Table 1 reports the results of the TOBIT estimations. Contrary to our prediction (H1), blockholder ownership was negatively associated with stock repurchases. In contrast, supporting our other hypotheses, CEO stock option pay (H2) was positive and significant, the interaction between recent total return and stock option pay (H3) was negative and significant, the interaction of uncertainty of performance and stock option pay (H4) was positive and significant, and the interaction of ex ante expected performance and realized performance (H5) was negative and significant.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION

-------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here --------------------------------
There is significant pressure on executives to invest resources in shareholder friendly strategic initiatives, even when superior investment alternatives exist within the firm. Implementing such initiatives, such as stock repurchase programs, reduces threats to executive tenure and wealth. When conditions are such that they maximize the uncertainty facing executives, the likelihood of repurchases is significantly higher. Thus, the results provide strong support for this behavioral view of strategic initiatives. After controlling for rational explanations for repurchases (e.g., performance expectations, firm cash flow), we found that executives initiated stock repurchase programs when they were most likely to help alleviate their personal uncertainty.
The results of this study have a number of important implications, they suggest that strategic initiatives such as stock repurchase programs are strongly influenced by behavioral factors. We found that shareholder friendly initiatives are not adopted solely because they may be good for shareholders, but also because they reduce uncertainty for executives and increase managerial wealth. Executives may use these initiatives as a way to send signals, reduce shareholder activism, and thereby gain greater discretion and less interference. 
